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THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIALIST THOUGHT
Noel B. Reynolds, author and copyright holder
Presentation at the International Mont Pelerin Society Conference
Berlin, Germany, September 16, 1982
ABSTRACT:
This presentation points to socialists’ mistaken assumptions of a malleable
and perfectible human nature as an insuperable reason for the inevitable
failure of socialist systems. It also points to socialist and liberal dependence
on declarations of human rights as ineffective protections for human
freedom—protections which can only be maintained in constitutionalist
systems with deeper structural safeguards against tyranny.
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Socialism in its various formulations was proposed historically as a simple
and direct solution to the problems of human misery and exploitation. The present
extent of socialism owes a great deal to its early ability to provide a moral vision
to a rootless intellectual class that had forgotten the eighteenth century arguments
for constitutionalism and was willing to reshape the world to fit romantic and
unproven notions of government and social organization.
It is worth noting in passing that it is the seductiveness of its moral and
intellectual simplicity which constitutes socialism's danger to the naive. For even
among the great intellectuals there have been many who have not been able to
understand (as Adam Smith did) the surprising complexity of human social
relations which makes a programmatic pursuit of positive social goals virtually
impossible. Indeed, it is far more intellectually demanding to understand an
economy in terms of a pervasive invisible hand mechanism than as a direct and
successful expression of human will. And it is much more satisfying for some to
explain human misery in terms of the evil intentions of powerful and wicked
people than to see it as an unintended result of restrictions on freedom, including
even those possibly intended to aid the miserable. Many simply are unable to
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grasp the fact that human society cannot be shaped and changed at will. They do
not see that man has a contrary nature which labors night and day in unpredictable
ways to undermine and circumvent the best laid plans of social designers and
gods. Rather, they implicitly assume simplistic models of man and society which
make it impossible for them to believe that a governmentally mandated
redistribution of incomes and goods could result in reduced material welfare for
almost all.
There are other ironies as well between socialist theory and practice which
might help alert honest thinkers to these weaknesses of socialist thought. Whereas
one common socialist objective is to enhance human dignity, the opposite more
often results in socialist societies. For what dignity has a man who cannot choose
his own purposes, but must instead submit his very life to the official quest for
material and social welfare? How can you raise a man's dignity by stripping from
him his agency and the only means by which he can preserve his independence of
thought and purpose? How can you dignify by dehumanizing?
Socialist thought assumes an idealistic human nature, but socialism deforms
that which is good in men by undercutting individual initiative. Socialist rhetoric
promotes various strong programs for human rights, while simultaneously
depriving individuals of their property, the very basis of individual human rights
as has long been recognized in most legal systems.
Socialism, furthermore, rejects law as an institution which can guide and
protect men in the orderly pursuit of their individually chosen ends, sanctifying
instead the state imposed ends of materialistic humanism and preventing by force
the vigorous pursuit of any other (and probably better) ends that individuals or
groups might choose for themselves.
From an even broader perspective we can note another irony of history. For
the prophets and theoreticians of socialism have always been most impractical
men, dreamers and romantics, driven by an optimism that has never yet borne
good fruit. Confident that their vision of the good is true, they propose to
nationalize the pursuit of the good. Meanwhile, the great architects of
constitutional government have ever been practical men, pessimistic of any great
results, and always fearful of the worst. But their cautious efforts have helped
provide millions with both the freedom and the means to pursue their personal
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dreams and romantic visions.
These comments provide a broader introduction than time will allow me to
develop. But I will pursue in some detail two essential points.
1. The catastrophe of socialist thought lies not so much in its moral vision
as in its empirical assumptions. For it assumes not only that material equality is a
morally desirable state of affairs, but also that man is a malleable and perfectible
being, and that the manifestations of selfishness and pride which we observe daily
in capitalist society are due primarily to imperfect or even downright iniquitous
social institutions which cause us to misbehave. This optimistic view of human
nature (which is almost never explicitly acknowledged by socialist thinkers)
underlies their claims that (1) they can change man by reforming faulty social
institutions, and that (2) the natural harmony and cooperativeness now dormant in
the human breast will blossom under the beneficent influence of socialist
institutions, redeeming an otherwise intolerable world.
The Anglo-American enlightenment embraced a much more conservative
view of man as a corruptible being. This was not the same as the view of
Christian philosophers that man is by nature fallen and evil. Nor was it like the
assumptions of modern economics that all men persistently and rationally pursue
their individual self-interest--though it was sympathetic to each of these. Rather
it was a complex view--a mixture of optimism and pessimism--which underlay
18th century republican thinking. It was a theory which first of all recognized the
heavy dependence of free institutions on a pervasive and high level of public
virtue, the willingness of people to respect the rights of others and contribute to
the maintenance and operation of public institutions, not out of fear or calculated
self-interest but out of a belief that it was right to do so.
Secondly, however, this more conservative view recognized the corruptibility of human nature, that public virtue was undependable, especially in those
cases where individuals had the opportunity to exploit government power for
personal gain. Rulers or aspirants to rule are too often easily tempted to
rationalize or forget the moral lessons of youth as they pursue their own
self-interest, even to the point of knowingly injuring innocent others or violating
law and morality.
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Without some government, the virtuous would be at the mercy of the
ruthless and unprincipled. Yet government itself provides the greatest
opportunities for ruthless exploitation. The optimistic side of republican thought
was therefore based on the insight that, given a largely virtuous population,
considerable freedom might be possible under a carefully restrained government.
Under such constitutional government men could reasonably pursue their own
visions of the good.
From this point of view we can see that the twin errors of socialist thought
are:
1.

ignoring the essential nature of constitutional limitations on
government power because of the assumption that man is perfectible
and the wise will do good--and with more power will do more good,
and

2.

presuming to define for all men the vision of the good which they
should seek. It is assumed that the State can provide this vision for
all if each will perform his or her assigned task.

If socialists are wrong about human nature, we might expect that their
experimentations with government will have worse results in terms of their own
values than a constitutional approach would have. From this argument we can
then see the priority of empirical over moral premises, an insight quite commonly
ignored in socialist thought. But any political or moral view which people are
willing to apply to human populations must also be examined for empirical
assumptions. It is not enough to make moral arguments for equality. Socialists
also need to argue for its possibility. They may then come to appreciate the law of
unforeseen consequences, the insight that the most important consequences of
social reforms will almost never be the ones intended. If human nature is such that
socialist forms of government produce negative equality relative to capitalist
forms, what can be the moral argument for persisting in socialist programs? Of
course, in practice we can see the self-interest of socialist rulers at work. But we
might hope some socialist thinkers would have less at stake.
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I feel it is very important that you understand that the particular conflict I
have described between the assumptions of socialist and constitutionalist thought
is an empirical matter. It is a difference of view about how men generally will
behave, especially when in possession of power. It is not necessarily a difference
of morals, about how people ought to treat one another. Rather, it is perfectly
possible that a man be a constitutionalist and believe in the moral correctness of
material equality, if his empirical view of man argues that applied socialism will
actually produce much less equality than will a constitutional approach to
government.
We can now see that some constitutional structures designed in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have not been adequate to deal with the
socialist challenge. The discovery by the many that government can be used to
redistribute wealth and the discovery that inflation can be used to finance further
benefits combine to present us with some very real needs for reforging our
constitutions, our agreements on procedures for making policy decisions. Though
most of these procedures of the past have proven remarkably resilient, we need to
realize that a constitution is an ongoing project. It may need occasional
readjustment as major changes occur in the economy or in the structure of social
beliefs. In the United States today we have lost our earlier implicit agreement not
to resort routinely to deficit spending. To provide politicians with some neutral
support in returning to sound fiscal management, a new constitutional articulation
may be necessary. Through the dedicated efforts of some members of this society
and others it now appears that we may be able to amend our constitution to remedy
this weakness.
So my first point has been that socialist thought generally fails to start at the
beginning with the question of possibility. What is human nature like, and what
social possibilities exist for man? By going straight to the moral issues of what
society should be like socialist thinkers implicitly assume a perfectible human
nature that can be cured of its iniquities under the tutelage of proper social and
economic institutions.
2. My second point will be that declarations of rights or moralistic political
principles count almost for nothing in constitutions. The eighteenth century
French declaration, the U.N. Declaration and the Soviet constitution are examples
of that. Rather, it is only institutional devices that can provide protection for our
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freedoms in a constitution. And these work only to the extent that the people are
attentive and use the institutional devices to resist encroachments on their rights.
But the essence of a constitution is nothing more than the agreed upon procedures
and accompanying rules for settling future disputes and questions of policy.
Because we need community decisions and because we cannot expect to agree on
all future cases, we find it necessary to agree on the future means by which our
disputes will be settled, thus committing ourselves to possible acceptance of
policies that we do not like.
The American founders followed the English example in complicating the
process of government decision making to the point that it would be almost
impossible for a tyrant to use the government efficiently to exploit the people. But
over time we have found shortcuts and carved loopholes to make government
more efficient and it has great control over our lives as a result. It is these
modifications which now cry out for remedy, even by constitutional amendment if
necessary.
As has already been pointed out, it is very important that constitutional
reform not attempt to deal directly with policy issues, but only with the
institutional structures and rules concerned with policy decisions. It is true that
many socialist elements have been introduced into capitalist states through policy
decisions rather than through constitutional changes. In most cases implicit
constitutional rules have been compromised. These developments create a need to
reconsider the matter and even look at the possibility of reaffirming those rules
explicitly or creating better ones by constitutional amendment.
But socialist constitutions carefully avoid these kinds of complications in
the decision making process. Government must be able to decide important
matters quickly and authoritatively and implement them efficiently that the social
welfare not suffer from inattention or dawdling. The result, of course, is not what
socialist rhetoric would prepare us to expect.
Please allow me in closing to share one personal anecdote which sums the
matter up in my mind. Many years ago I visited Prague, the once proud and
beautiful capital of Czechoslovakia. For various reasons I suddenly decided to
leave early and found that I could catch a Pan Am flight if I could get to the airport
in one hour. I threw my luggage together, paid my hotel bill and rushed out to the
street to find a taxi. At first I was relieved to see four shiny black state owned
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taxis parked nearby. But as I looked around I realized that the drivers were even
further away playing cards and trying very hard to pretend they had not noticed my
very obvious presence. My heart sank as I saw the impossibility of securing the
very great cooperation that would be needed from one of them to get me to that
plane on time.
But just as dismay began to register, I was startled by squealing brakes and
an almost instantaneous inquiry in my language, "Taxi to the airport, sir?" A
skinny and unkempt man peered at me eagerly over his worn blue SIMCA. I
quickly recovered, accepted his offer, and we were off in a cloud of dust.
Enroute I began to probe the mystery of my good fortune. I found that he
was indeed a private licensed cabbie and that his monthly license fee was nearly
enough to pay the salaries of those four card players. As we talked on I
determined to ask his feelings about socialism. As my question registered, he
looked directly at me in the rear view mirror and responded quietly, "How do you
like socialism?" I had no trouble stating briefly my disapproval, and then he
looked down and responded quietly. "We do not like it either. We would rather
have our freedom."

